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I. INTRODUCTION
The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) was enacted in 1977 to prohibit
U.S. companies and companies operating in the United States from paying
bribes to foreign government officials, politicians, and political parties for the
purpose of obtaining business opportunities abroad. 1 In the past thirty-five
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years, the anti-bribery provisions of the law remain consistent but its
enforcement has expanded considerably. This Article will provide an overview
of the FCPA, its evolution, and its current enforcement. The Article is aimed as
a resource for practitioners to counsel clients who want to expand into
international business or face potential FCPA charges. While this Article will
not detail the high-profile FCPA cases, the information here is designed to help
today's lawyers understand where the law came from and how the law is being
used in the modern environment of ever-increasing international business
transactions.
II. ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF THE FCPA
Scholars have suggested that the FCPA was drafted in global and economic
circumstances not dissimilar to those today. Prior to the FCPA, the United
States experienced a rapid economic expansion and involvement with foreign
wars, followed by corporate scandals and a quickly declining economy. 2 In the
1970s, the public was concerned by defective corporate management,
inadequate risk calculation, and weal internal corporate communication. 3 One
need only recall the recent fall of AIG, WorldCom, Lehman Brothers, and the
housing "bubble" in recent years to understand some of the environment in
which the FCPA was passed in the 1970s.
But there were more specific circumstances that caused Congress to draft
the FCPA. In the early 1970s during the Cold War, approximately 400
companies had admitted to paying over $300 million in bribes to foreign
officials. 4 Stanley Sporkin, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
Enforcement Chief at the time, conducted an investigation uncovering these
questionable or illegal payments from over one hundred Fortune 500
companies, including Exxon and Lockheed Martin. 5
The philosophy behind the law is that corrupt systems are unjust and
unstable, with bribes often spiraling out of control and only providing a short-
term benefit.6 Bribes increase product prices, reduce corporate profits, and are
suggested to decrease growth and lower per capita income. 7
thank Laura Hartnett, Esq. for her invaluable contributions to this Article. This Article is
dedicated to Mr. Crites's grandchildren, Tommy and Peyton Conklin.
See generally Homer E. Moyer, Jr. et al., The U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Its
Origins, Development, Implementation, and Issues to Watch, 14 INT'L Q. 455, 459 (2002).
2 Amy Deen Westbrook, Enthusiastic Enforcement, Informal Legislation: The Unruly
Expansion of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 45 GA. L. REV. 489, 500 (2011).
31d.
4 Eric M. Zyla, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: A Brief Overview, 4 ANKARA B. REV.
11, 13 (2011).
5 Michael B. Bixby, The Lion Awakens: The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 1977 to
2010, 12 SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J. 89, 93 (2010); H.R. REP. No. 95-640, at 4-5 (1977).6 Zyla, supra note 4, at 17.
7 1d. at 17.
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At the time that the FCPA was first contemplated, Congress considered a
mandatory disclosure approach in which companies would be required to
publicly disclose corrupt foreign payments or risk criminal penalty. 8 In the end,
Congress chose the criminalization approach, making improper payments to
foreign officials illegal and not requiring disclosure outright.9 The federal
agency prosecuting acts under the FCPA must prove a list of elements to
determine if a bribery occurred.' 0
A. Bribes and Extortion Payments
One of the major challenges to the FCPA is detecting and prosecuting
bribery. 11 Companies operating abroad experience a variety of demands for
money above and beyond the goods and services that are the subject of the
transaction. Bribes can be as small as extra money to customs officials, requests
for sponsorship of an activity or event, or the purchase of stamps for employee
passports permitting them to move more freely throughout the country. 12 While
these relatively small payments may help to improve a corporation's treatment
in the country, extortion demands a payment or the corporation will risk worse
treatment in the country.1 3 Extortion might include extra payments,
compensation, surcharges, or fictitious fines. 14
The exact amount of money paid in bribes or transactions in which a bribe
is offered or requested is nearly impossible to calculate, although organizations
are trying to collect such data. 15 What is tricky about bribes and other FCPA
issues is that foreign agents can conceal bribes as "service fees," "facilitation
fees," or "commissions" that are hidden to the corporation paying such fees. 16
Also, some companies may only find out that the foreign company with which
they are transacting business has government ownership or strong ties after they
are deep in the commercial transaction. 17
8 Daniel J. Grimm, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in Merger and Acquisition
Transactions: Successor Liability and Its Consequences, 7 N.Y.U. J.L. & Bus. 247, 260
(2010).
9 Id. at 261.
10 Bixby, supra note 5, at 94.
11 Zyla, supra note 4, at 15.
12 Joseph W. Yockey, Solicitation, Extortion, and the FCPA, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REv.
781, 795 (2011).
13 1d at 795-96.
14 1d at 796.
15 1d at 797-98.
161d. at 811.
17Id.
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B. Amendments to the FCPA
1. 1988 Amendments
The earliest call to amend the FCPA came in the late 1980s when the U.S.
trade deficit remained high. Critics wanted to eliminate obstacles against
exports and noted that the law "was so vague as to be indecipherable."]' 8 it was
at this point in time that Congress also recommended that other nations pass
similar anti-corruption laws. 19 As a result, the law was amended as part of the
Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988.20 In this amendment,
Congress made the mens rea requirement more strict.21 It also clarified the
meaning of "retaining or obtaining business" under the FCPA.22 At the same
time, these amendments expanded the FCPA's scope to include foreign citizens
and businesses acting within the United States.23
2. 1998 Amendments
The second round of amendments was a direct response to the Organisation
for Economic Co-operation and Development's (OECD) Convention on
Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business
Transactions, held in November of 1997.24 At this convention, the OECD called
on each of its thirty member countries to institute "effective measures to deter,
prevent and combat the bribery of foreign public officials in connection with
international business transactions." 25 Congress ratified the Convention and
passed amendments to the FCPA, broadening the language of the original Act,
now focusing more upon what the bribers wanted to achieve rather than how
they intended to affect or influence the official. 26 It expanded the definition of a
18 Bixby, supra note 5, at 97.
191d. at 98 n.34.
20U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OMNIBUS TRADE AND COMPETITIVENESS ACT OF 1988, H. R.
REP. No. 100-576, at 916-24 (1988) (Conf. Rep.), available at http://www.justice.
gov/criminal/fraud/fcpahistory/ 1988/tradeact- 100-418.pdf.
21 William Alan Nelson 1I, Attorney Liability Under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act:
Legal and Ethical Challenges and Solutions, 39 U. MEM. L. REV. 255, 258 (2009).22 1d.
2 3 1d at 259.
24 See generally Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development,
Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business
Transactions 6 (2011), available at http://www.oecd.org/daf/briberyininternationalbusiness/
anti-briberyconvention/38028044.pdf.2 5 Bixby, supra note 5, at 99-100. In 2009, the OECD adopted additional anti-bribery
recommendations and issued a "Good Practice Guidance" which may offer more compliance
guidance than the current FCPA. See Westbrook, supra note 2, at 511.26 Cortney C. Thomas, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: A Decade of Rapid
Expansion Explained, Defended, and Justified, 29 REv. LITIG. 439, 448 (2010).
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"foreign official" and extended the FCPA's jurisdiction outside of U.S.
borders. 27 Anyone, either acting directly or through an agent, can be prosecuted
for furthering a corrupt payment that takes place within the United States.28
Therefore, the Act now implicates foreign agents and U.S. nationals living
outside the United States.
III. CONTENTS OF THE FCPA
At its core, the FCPA prohibits bribes to foreign officials and requires
detailed accounting standards regarding all foreign payments. This section will
also address a few of the nuances in applying these two basic edicts of the law.
A. Anti-Bribery
1. Bribes to a Foreign Official
The anti-bribery portion of the FCPA prohibits improper payments to a
foreign official.29 A "foreign official" is defined as "any officer or employee of
a foreign government or any department, agency, or instrumentality thereof."30
Therefore, this definition includes employees of alleged state-owned or state-
controlled enterprises. 31 This approach to improper payments indicates that
every employee, without respect to rank or position of an instrumentality, is a
foreign official.32 The Department of Justice (DOJ) has noted that "it is entirely
possible, under certain circumstances and in certain countries, that nearly every
aspect of the approval, manufacture, import, export, pricing, sale and marketing
of a ... product in a foreign country will involve a 'foreign official' within the
meaning of the FCPA." 33 What is more frustrating is that "instrumentality" is
not further defined in the law. Companies and their attorneys are left searching
for definitions in other laws such as the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
(FSIA) and its use in other laws. 34
DOJ and the SEC have worked on enforcement actions involving improper
payments to employees of a company where the state owned as little as 43% of
the company's shares, had veto power, and made operational decisions, despite
the company describing itself as privatized. 35 What is more, courts have not
27 Bixby, supra note 5, at 100.
2 8 1d at 101.
29 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (2006).
3 0 1d § 78dd- 1 (f)(1)(A) (2006).
31 Mike Koehler, Big, Bold, and Bizarre: The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Enters a
New Era, 43 U. TOL. L. REV. 99, 108 (2011) [hereinafter Koehler, Big, Bold, and Bizarre].
3 2 Stacy Williams, Grey Areas of FCPA Compliance, 17 CURRENTS: INT'L TRADE L.J.
14, 15 (2008).
3 3 Yockey, supra note 12, at 820-21.
34 Williams, supra note 32, at 16.
3 5 Koehler, Big, Bold, and Bizarre, supra note 31, at 116 17.
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resolved the question of whether those working for a subsidiary of a subsidiary
owned by a foreign state are considered agents or instruments of the state
itself.36 Yet, when drafting the FCPA, Congress was aware of state-owned
enterprises and chose not to include such companies in its definitions or
concepts contained within the law. 37
As the law was passed in 1977, the definition of a foreign official, however,
did not include an employee of a foreign government with ministerial or clerical
duties. 38 But in 1988, Congress amended the FCPA, removed this exception,
and altered the language to create an exception for payments in connection with
"routine governmental action." 3 9 "Routine governmental action" is intended to
refer to obtaining permits, licenses, or other governmental approvals to enable
one to conduct business in a foreign country, also known as "grease
payments." 40 "[R]outine governmental action does not include the issuance of
every official document or every inspection." 4 1 Instead, it covers "very narrow
categories of largely non-discretionary, ministerial activities performed by mid-
or low-level foreign functionaries. '" 42 But the federal government has still
prosecuted cases under the FCPA that allege payments to secure foreign
licenses, permits, applications, and the like.43 Some evidence appears to show
that there may be an informal limit of $1,000 for grease payments.44 But there
have been no court decisions interpreting the definition of "grease payments;"
instead courts have indicated that they would focus on the "intent of the payer
and the purpose of the payment." 45
2. "Obtain or Retain Business"
The FCPA prohibits offering or paying "anything of value" to a "foreign
official" for the purpose of "influencing any act or decision," "inducing such
foreign official to do or omit to do any act in violation of the lawful duty,"
''securing any improper advantage," or "inducing such foreign official to use his
influence... to affect or influence any act or decision.., to assist.., in
36 Westbrook, supra note 2, at 533.
3 7 Koehler, Big, Bold, and Bizarre, supra note 31, at 117.
3 8 See Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, § 104, 91 Stat. 1494,
1498, amended by Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Amendments of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-
418, tit. V, subtit. A, pt. 1, 102 Stat. 1415 and by International Anti-Bribery and Fair
Competition Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-366, 112 Stat. 3302 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
39 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-I(b) (2006).
40 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-I(f)(3)(A) (2006); Bixby, supra note 5, at 110.
41 United States v. Kay, 359 F.3d 738, 751 (5th Cir. 2004).
4 2 1d.
43 Koehler, Big, Bold, and Bizarre, supra note 31, at 122-25 (discussing recent
enforcement actions stemming from the payment of grease money).
4 4 Bixby, supra note 5, at 110.
4 5 David E. Dworsky, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 671, 684
(2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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obtaining or retaining business for or with, or directing business to, any
person." 46 This so-called business nexus test has little further guidance in the
law.4 7
The Fifth Circuit has interpreted this provision as prohibiting payments
aimed at lowering taxes and custom duties in a foreign country. 4 8 The Fifth
Circuit found that the government must show a clear "cause-and-effect" how
the benefit from the bribe will aid the person paying the bribe in obtaining or
retaining business and specifically what business that is.4 9 Still, the court found
that "the business nexus requirement is not to be interpreted unduly narrowly" 50
and almost any situation could meet the test with the proper factual allegations.
The FCPA would seem to suggest that corporations are entitled to a defense
if they paid extortion costs to prevent serious bodily harm, but this issue has
never been clarified. Similarly, economic extortion that may do significant
monetary damage has not been excepted in precise terms. 5 1 One federal court
held that "true extortion" is excepted but distinguished economic extortion,
noting that a company can always walk away from economic threats.52
Businesses are left to wonder on mere conjecture how extreme economic
extortion has to be until it is considered "true extortion."
3. "Anything of Value"
The FCPA does not define "anything of value." We know from
enforcement actions that it can include promises of future consideration and in-
kind offers.53 These have ranged from briefcases stuffed with cash to an
executive training program at a U.S. university for Chinese officials. 54 The SEC
has even pursued and investigated a case in which a company made a monetary
donation to a local charity in an alleged attempt to influence a government
official. 55 There has been no stated de minimis exception to define "anything of
value." 5 6
46 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(a)(1) (2006).
47 Williams, supra note 32, at 17.4 8 United States v. Kay, 359 F.3d 738, 756 (5th Cir. 2004).
4 9 1d. at 740-41.
50 1d. at 754.
51 Yockey, supra note 12, at 814.
52 United States v. Kozeny, 582 F. Supp. 2d 535, 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
53 Westbrook, supra note 2, at 538.
5 4 Mike Koehler, The Faqade of FCPA Enforcement, 41 GEO. J. INT'L L. 907, 914-15
(2010) [hereinafter Koehler, Facade].
55 Westbrook, supra note 2, at 539.
5 6 1d.
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4. The Issue of Successor Liability
Recent concern has been expressed from the business community, the
media, and politicians alike about the implications of the FCPA for successor
liability. For example, a corporation is not immune from FCPA enforcement for
the conduct of its subsidiaries that it acquired years after the FCPA violations
took place.57 As a result, companies are forced to take significant measures to
conduct FCPA due diligence before acquiring companies and becoming parties
to mergers. 58 The concern remains that the FCPA then creates an overly
cautious business environment in which mergers and acquisitions that would
otherwise take place do not.59 Some would rather see a safe harbor standard or
more clear standards in the next revisions of the FCPA. 60
B. Accounting Requirements
Much like the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,61 the FCPA details specific,
required accounting and bookkeeping standards that apply to publicly-held
entities known as "issuers." 62 These companies have securities registered with
the SEC, are required to file reports under Section 15(d) of the Exchange Act,
or own more than fifty percent of the voting stock in another entity. 63 Non-
material payments that are not accurately recorded can be construed as a
violation of the FCPA.64 In addition, the books must be kept with "reasonable
detail" 65 requiring a "level of detail and degree of assurance as would satisfy
prudent officials in the conduct of their own affairs." 66 Companies must also
create internal accounting control provisions, including such factors as
establishing the role of the board of directors, communicating corporate
procedures and policies, having competent personnel, assigning authority and
responsibility, taking accountability for performance, and performing objective
and effective internal audit functions. 67 The goal of these record-keeping
provisions is to prevent three types of wrongdoings: (1) failing to record illegal
transactions; (2) falsifying records to conceal illegal transactions; and (3)
5 7 Grimm, supra note 8, at 252-53.
5 81d. at 253.
5 9 See id at 299 300.60 1d.
61 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in
scattered sections of 15 & 18 U.S.C.). "[The Sarbanes-Oxley Act] has contributed to
increased FCPA enforcement because its reporting requirements expanded the amount of
information to which the government has access." Westbrook, supra note 2, at 515.
62 See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2) (2006).6 3 Bixby, supra note 5, at 96-97.
6 4 1d. at 96.
65 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(A) (2006).
66 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(7) (2006).
67 Westbrook, supra note 2, at 508-09.
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creating records that are monetarily accurate but fail to specify qualitative
aspects of the transaction. 68
For criminal liability under this portion of the FCPA, a person must
"knowingly circumvent or knowingly fail to implement a system of internal
accounting controls or knowingly falsify any book, record, or account described
in [the provisions]. ' 69 Under the law, there is no criminal liability for technical
or insignificant accounting errors. 70
But given the heightened enforcement environment, liability under the
accounting provisions is almost strict liability. There may be criminal liability,
however, for willful blindness. 71 Senior executives who fail to act in good faith
or directly or indirectly induce FCPA violations can be held liable if bribery
occurs under their leadership, even if the executive lacked knowledge of the
bribes. 72 Ultimately, the Judicial Branch plays an active role in sentencing and
considers mitigating factors. 73
C. Affirmative Defenses
The FCPA does identify two affirmative defenses on which companies and
individuals can rely. An individual is not liable for payments that are legal in
the country in which they are made, "lawful under the written laws" of the
foreign officials' country. 74 When this provision was added in 1988, it
responded to a criticism that "the United States was more interested in
exporting its cultural biases than its products" as certain payments to foreign
officials are routine and customary in other countries and cultures. 75 Ironically,
it is worth noting that FCPA experts have never found such a law that explicitly
permits such a payment. 76 Extra payments to foreign officials are more likely to
be a customary norm in other countries rather than an officially sanctioned
process as written in the country's laws. 77
Second, payments for "reasonable and bona fide expenditures" are
permitted. 78 These "reasonable and bona fide expenditures" might include
travel and lodging expenses incurred for a foreign official if directly related to
6 8 Dworsky, supra note 45, at 676.
6915 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(5) (2006).
70 15 U.S.C § 78m(b)(4) (2006).
71 Westbrook, supra note 2, at 547.
72 Jon Jordan, Recent Developments in the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and the New
UK Bribery Act: A Global Trend Towards Greater Accountability in The Prevention Of
Foreign Bribery, 7 N.Y.U. J. L. & Bus. 845, 868 (2011).
7 3 Koehler, Big, Bold, and Bizarre, supra note 31, at 138.
74 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(c)(1), 78dd-2(c)(1), & 78dd-3(c)(1) (2006).
7 5 Kyle P. Sheahen, I'm Not Going to Disneyland: Illusory Affirmative Defenses Under
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 28 WIS. INT'L L.J. 464, 469 (2010-11).76 Lawrence J. Trautman & Kara Altenbaumer-Price, The Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act: Minefieldfor Directors, 6 VA. L. & Bus. REv. 145, 157 (2011).
77 Sheahen, supra note 75, at 470.
78 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(c)(2), 78dd-2(c)(2), & 78dd-3(c)(2) (2006).
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the "promotion, demonstration, or explanation of products or services" or "the
execution or performance of a contract with a foreign government or agency
thereof."79 But there still exists many questions as to what promotion expenses
are customary and reasonable under the law.80 Even minor payments to attempt
to favorably influence foreign agents by purchasing some of their goodwill
could be considered "corrupt" and aimed at "securing [an] improper
advantage." 8 1 In one enforcement action, the DOJ settlement indicated that
airline tickets for a government official and his family and lavish travel are not
reasonable, and cash advances for such travel do not constitute bona fide
expenditures. 82 But paying such expenses as travel, lodging, and gifts for
foreign government officials remains one of the most common issues that
international corporations face.8 3
IV. ENFORCEMENT OF THE FCPA
All criminal enforcement of the FCPA and civil enforcement of the anti-
bribery provisions of the FCPA falls to DOJ.84 All civil enforcement of
accounting provisions and anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA falls to the
SEC. 85 Occasionally, courts will permit both DOJ and the SEC to work jointly
in a parallel investigation.8 6 In rare occasions, courts will permit private parties
to bring civil FCPA claims.8 7 These claims may be brought in conjunction with
private suits stemming from RICO civil actions, securities fraud, shareholder
derivative actions, whistleblower litigation, ERISA actions, as well as general
tort and contract claims.8 8 For example, a shareholder derivative action with
FCPA claims may be brought when the company declares it was in compliance
with the FCPA and fails to disclose payments of foreign bribes that then result
in federal penalties, millions in investigation costs expended by the company,
and a decrease in the price of the stock.89
7 9 Id. § 78dd-1 (c)(2)(A)-(B) (2006).
80 Williams, supra note 32, at 18.
81 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(a)(1)(A)(iii) (2006); Sheahen, supra note 75, at 478.
82 Litigation Release No. 20414, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, SEC Files Settled Action
Against Lucent Technologies, Inc. in Connection with Payment of Chinese Officials' Travel
and Entertainment Expenses; Company Agrees to Pay $1.5 Million Civil Penalty (Dec. 21,
2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2007/lr20414.htm.
83 Westbrook, supra note 2, at 544.
84 Jordan, supra note 72, at 852 53.
8 5 d.
86 Dworsky, supra note 45, at 685-86.8 71d. at 686.
8 8 Trautman & Altenbaumer-Price, supra note 76, at 173 74.
8 9 See id at 174 76.
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A. Enforcement Against Individuals
Penalties for violating the FCPA may result in monetary and civil penalties
and imprisonment for willful violations. 90 An individual who violates the FCPA
willfully can be fined, imprisoned, or both. However, one cannot be imprisoned
without knowledge. 91 Penalties are generally determined in accordance with the
advice in the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. 92 Willful violations can result in up to
$5,000,000 in fines and a prison sentence of up to twenty years for
individuals. 93 The Alternative Fines Act can institute penalties up to two times
the gross financial gain or loss derived from the improper payment.94 And,
despite directors and executives possibly operating under the belief that the
company will pay any fines found against them as individuals, fines for
individuals cannot be paid by their company. 95
In recent years, fines imposed for FCPA violations have been lower than
those recommended under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. 96 While DOJ
consistently promotes its FCPA enforcement program as one focusing on the
prosecution of individuals, there have been relatively very few individual
prosecutions. 97 One author suggests that this is due to the fact that DOJ cannot
satisfy its high burden of proof to criminally indict an individual. 98
Still, recent enforcement trends with the FCPA demonstrate that there are
ever increasing prosecutions brought against individuals. Arguably, the law was
written for corporate enforcement but now individuals find themselves as the
recipients of federal indictments in about sixty percent of FCPA enforcement
cases. 99 True to the 1998 Amendments expanding the reach of the FCPA, new
enforcement actions have been brought against more and more foreign
individuals.10 0 Lanny Breuer noted in 2010 that in the past five years of DOJ's
enforcement of FCPA actions, the Department charged seventy-seven
individuals with FCPA violations, resulting in "more than the total number of
indictments brought in the previous seven years combined."'1 1 Pursuing the
"aggressive prosecution of individuals" and obtaining "significant prison
90 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(c) (2006).
91 Id. § 78ff(a) (2006).
9 2 Dworsky, supra note 45, at 687.
9 31d. at 688.
94 Sheahen, supra note 75, at 468.
95 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(g)(3) (2006).
96 Koehler, Big, Bold, and Bizarre, supra note 31, at 128.
9 7 1d. at 129.
9 8 1d.
9 9 Bixby, supra note 5, at 111.
10 0 1d. at 112 (identifying a number of recent examples of foreign individuals charged
with FCPA violations).
101 Lanny A. Breuer, Assistant Attorney Gen., Criminal Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice,
Speech at the Meeting of the Council on Foreign Relations: International Criminal Law
Enforcement: Rule of Law, Anti-Corruption, and Beyond (May 4, 2010) available at
http://www.cfr.org/publication/22048/internationalcriminal law enforcement.html.
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sentences for individuals" have become the "cornerstone" of FCPA
enforcement policy. 10 2
B. Enforcement Against Corporations
The maximum penalty for corporations under the U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines is $25,000,000 for willful violations of the FCPA accounting
provisions. 10 3 The maximum penalty is $2,000,000 for corporate breaches of
the anti-bribery provisions. 10 4 Yet one has to remember that these criminal
penalties can be combined with civil penalties that can include monetary fines
and injunctions, and suspension from participating in government procurement
activities. 10 5 In recent years, Congress has added additional penalties for
violating the FCPA. Any corporation in violation of the FCPA's anti-bribery
provisions can be debarred from any contract or grant awarded by the federal
government within thirty days after final judgment. 10 6
Recent prosecutions have included a relatively new penalty of the
disgorgement of profits tied to any actions related to FCPA violations. In one
case, disgorgement contributed to over half of the total monetary penalty. 0 7 As
a result of this new development, the level of the fines, fees, and penalties has
dramatically increased in recent years. 10 8
C. The Era of Enforcement
The year 2004 served as a turning point in the enforcement of FCPA
violations (or potential violations). In the first twenty-five years of the FCPA's
existence, DOJ and the SEC only pursued sixty cases against corporations under
the FCPA. 10 9 These cases focused on bribery or issues with accounting records,
conspiracy to violate the FCPA, false statements, money laundering, and wire
fraud. 110 In 2009, the Deputy Chief of the Fraud Section in DOJ's Criminal
Division, Mark F. Mendelsohn, noted that at least 120 companies were the
current subjects of ongoing FCPA investigations.1 1' By 2009, federal agencies
were pursuing as many as twenty-six prosecutions a year compared to their
prior two prosecutions a year. 112 The more current investigations by the SEC
and DOJ are targeted towards entire market sectors, including oil and gas,
102 Trautman & Altenbaumer-Price, supra note 76, at 160.
103 Dworsky, supra note 45, at 689.
104 Id.
105 Id. at 689-90.
106 Overseas Contractor Reform Act, H.R. 5366, 11 1th Cong. § 2(a) (2010).
107 Westbrook, supra note 2, at 556 57 (2011).
10 8 Bixby, supra note 5, at 109.
109 Id. at 103.
110 Id.
I I I Trautman & Altenbaumer-Price, supra note 76, at 158.
112Bixby, supra note 5, at 105.
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technology, pharmaceuticals, and medical supplies. 113 Combined FCPA
enforcement by DOJ and the SEC in 2010 resulted in $1.8 billion in combined
corporate fines and penalties. 114 But ten years prior, there was one FCPA
enforcement action resulting in $300,000 in fines. 115 In 2010, fifty percent of
the total fines and penalties collected by DOJ's Criminal Division were FCPA-
related enforcement. 116 In that same year, DOJ's Assistant Attorney General for
the Criminal Division, Lanny Breuer, gave a speech noting the agency's
involvement in thirty-six corporate FCPA and foreign bribery-related
resolutions with fines totaling more than $1.5 billion. 117 DOJ made FCPA
enforcement a priority "second only to fighting terrorism in terms of
priority." 118
Federal agencies have also ramped up staffing and dedicated more
resources to pursuing FCPA actions. Since 2004, DOJ has identified two
attorneys to focus only on FCPA cases, and the FBI has created a four-person
team to handle FCPA investigations solely. 119 In 2009, the SEC announced that
it was creating an entire FCPA unit to "focus on new and proactive approaches
to identifying" FCPA violations in addition to working closely with its sister
agencies and counterparts in foreign countries to address FCPA violations. 120
The specialized FCPA unit in the SEC is different from a normal unit. The
FCPA unit benefits from enhanced training, specialized experience, and targets
investigative approaches all towards conducting more efficient and effective
investigations. 12 1 The FCPA unit is also located in locations across the United
States, including Boston, Washington, D.C., Fort Worth, San Francisco, and
Los Angeles. 122 With all of this additional personnel across federal agencies,
FCPA enforcement will only continue to rise. 12 3
Some of this recently increased enforcement activity may have been due to
the economic boom of the mid-2000s, where even small businesses were
113 Westbrook, supra note 2, at 523 24.
114Koehler, Big, Bold, and Bizarre, supra note 31, at 100 04.
1151d. at 104.
116/d. at 105.
117 Breuer, supra note 101.
118 Grimm, supra note 8, at 249-50 (citation omitted).
119 Bixby, supra note 5, at 104; see also Trautman & Altenbaumer-Price, supra note 76,
at 162 n.99 ("DOJ also has a dedicated foreign bribery unit within its Criminal Fraud
Section.").
12 0 See Robert Khuzami, Dir., Div. of Enforcement, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n,
Remarks Before the N.Y.C. Bar: My First 100 Days as Director of Enforcement (Aug.
5,2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2009/spchO80509rk.htm; Cheryl
Scarboro, Chief of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Unit, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n,
Remarks at News Conference Announcing New SEC Leaders in Enforcement Division (Jan.
13, 2010) available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2010 /spch0 11310newsconf.
htm#scarboro.
121 Trautman & Altenbaumer-Price, supra note 76, at 162.
1221d. at 162 63.
123 Westbrook, supra note 2, at 560.
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reaching abroad and fighting for international business in order to compete. 124
The following contraction of the market caused many corporate consolidations
that may not have taken the time and resources to investigate any prior
questionable payments or accounting practices of the newly-acquired
company. 125 The SEC also had to redeem itself in the public eye from a number
of high-profile fraud cases that went undetected for years. 126
D. Enforcement in the Years to Come
There is no sign of stopping these recent trends, and new laws and policies
only appear to enhance FCPA enforcement in the future. Enforcement actions
are bound to increase after the passage of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act in 2010. The SEC has been steadily receiving
more than one FCPA tip a day since the law provides for monetary incentives
and protections for whistleblowers that report certain securities violations.12 7
Also going forward, a qualifying whistleblower who voluntarily provides
original information to the SEC that leads to a successful enforcement action
under the FCPA may receive anywhere from ten to thirty percent of the
recovered amount. 128 The long-term impact of this whistleblower "twist" in the
law on enforcement actions, in both type and quantity, is yet unknown. There is
no end in sight to this steady increase in enforcement cases and the amount of
fines pursued in FCPA actions. 129
E. The Reaction by Corporations to the Era of Enforcement
To avoid or lessen these fines and penalties, companies are spending
hundreds of millions of dollars on professional costs in connection with FCPA
inquiries and investigations. 130 One company revealed that it spent $3.2 million
to investigate $50,000 of allegedly improper payments from a foreign branch
that constitutes about .05% of the company's annual revenue. 131
At the same time, all of this aggressive enforcement against companies by
federal agencies has led to more corporations self-reporting FCPA violations.
Self-reporting is rumored to result in more lenient sentencing than those who
would have been prosecuted for the same illegal action but did not disclose the
1241d. at 518 19.
125/ I.at 519.
126/ I.at 520-21.
127Id at 525.
12 8 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, § 922 (2010).
129 Jordan, supra note 72, at 856.
130 Koehler, Big, Bold, and Bizarre, supra note 31, at 106 (noting examples of
companies that have spent anywhere from $3.2 million to $100 million on professional costs
towards internal inquiries and investigations).
131 Yockey, supra note 12, at 823.
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action to the appropriate authorities. 132 Voluntary disclosure shifts enforcement
costs to the private sector by encouraging behavior and reporting that is both
cheaper and more effective for the federal agencies that pursue FCPA
enforcement actions. 13 3 Today, a business may tell federal agencies that it is
conducting an internal investigation and then report the results. Ideally,
businesses will also cooperate with any resulting government investigation and
implement immediate compliance measures to take corrective action against the
FCPA violations. 134
F. Alternative Prosecution Agreements
When a company is faced with FCPA prosecution, many find it cheaper,
easier, and more efficient not to fight the charges. An offer of a non-prosecution
agreement (NPA) or a deferred prosecution agreement (DPA) is likely a more
attractive offer than having your company criminally indicted and building a
legal defense to the charges. 135 Typically, NPAs are a contract between a
company and the government without court approval, while DPAs typically
occur after the government files a formal charge and do require court
submission or approval. 13 6
These options are a kind of "diversion program" that punishes a business
but allows the business to escape the potential consequences of a full
prosecution against it. 137 Essentially, the business signs a contract that defers
the company's prosecution, arranging for any charges to be dismissed after the
company successfully completes items in the agreement. 138 Most DPAs hold
the corporation vicariously liable for the acts of its employees, require that the
corporation fire wrongdoers, and waive certain procedural rights, while paying
a fine and implementing a compliance program. 139 These agreements may also
include a monitoring program for one to three years, requiring the monitor to
send periodic reports to the government. 140 "A monitor is an external person
who often sits on the board of the company," wields significant power to
influence company policies and procedures, and serves as a significant cost to
the company. 14 1
Whereas a plea agreement would involve a court proceeding, the problem
with this seemingly more attractive route is that there is little to no judicial
132 Bixby, supra note 5, at 115.
133 Grimm, supra note 8, at 255.
134/ I.at 273, 276.
13 5 Koehler, Big, Bold, and Bizarre, supra note 31, at 126.
136Lauren Giudice, Note, Regulating Corruption: Analyzing Uncertainty in Current
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Enforcement, 91 B.U. L. REv. 347, 361 (2011).
137 Thomas, supra note 26, at 451-52.
138/ I.at 452.
139/ I.at 452-53.
140 Giudice, supra note 136, at 370.
141 Westbrook, supra note 2, at 558.
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scrutiny of NPAs or DPAs. 142 "Prosecutors[,] therefore[,] enjoy a significant
amount of discretion when negotiating and creating pre-trial diversion
agreements, which may make it difficult for corporations to know what to
expect ex ante." 143 Still, the body of "law" comprised of FCPA enforcements
has mostly been developed through these privately-negotiated agreements. 144
While access to prior agreements is growing, companies are not likely to know
all of the details of the NPAs or DPAs that companies in their positions have
signed under similar circumstances. 145 Companies have little bargaining rights
and are at the mercy of what is proposed in the NPA or DPA by the agency
threatening further criminal action. "In fact, no business entity has publicly
challenged either enforcement agency in an FCPA case in the last twenty
years."146
V. ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE
Despite the pervasive uncertainty throughout the law, there have been no
regulations to implement or further clarify the FCPA subject to one minor
exception 47: companies may submit detailed, written descriptions of
prospective conduct and ask the Attorney General to issue an opinion to
determine if the conduct would violate the FCPA or not.14 8 These opinions are
then published by DOJ but do not apply to any other company besides the
original requestor. 149 "A compliant FCPA Opinion creates a rebuttable
presumption for future actions against the issuer or domestic concern that the
described conduct complies with the FCPA."'150 The opinion binds DOJ but
does not bind other agencies, such as the SEC, from pursuing enforcement
actions against the exact action that DOJ may have recommended.15 1 DOJ has
released only fifty-six opinions to date, generally one to three per year in recent
years. 152 The SEC has a similar Opinion Release program, intended to provide
142 Koehler, Big, Bold, and Bizarre, supra note 31, at 126; Koehler, Faqade, supra note
54, at 909; Giudice, supra note 136, at 361.
143 Giudice, supra note 136, at 366.
144 Koehler, Facade, supra note 54, at 910.
14 5 Giudice, supra note 136, at 366.
146 Westbrook, supra note 2, at 562.
147/ I.at 502-03.
148 Sheahen, supra note 75, at 486.
14 9 Giudice, supra note 136, at 357. See generally DOJ Fraud Section, FCPA Opinion
Procedure Releases, JUSTICE.GOV, http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/opinion (last
visited Aug. 20, 2012).
150 Giudice, supra note 136, at 357.
151 Id
152 See DOJ Fraud Section, supra note 149; DOJ Fraud Section, FCPA Review
Procedure Releases, JUSTICE.GOV, http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/review (last
visited Aug. 20, 2012).
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guidance to the prospective action of businesses, but it was last used to clarify
its interpretation of the FCPA in 1981.153
VI. THE IMPACT OF THE FCPA AND FUTURE REFORMS
At the time that the FCPA was first made law, the United States was more
unique than other countries in prohibiting bribes to another country's
officials. 154 But perhaps as a result, the United States lost international contracts
in countries where foreign firms have bribed foreign governments but U.S.
firms are prohibited by law from doing so. 155 Other countries even allowed
bribes to be tax deductible. 156 In one study, about fifty-one percent of
companies delayed a business initiative and fourteen percent canceled a
business initiative due to confusing anti-corruption laws. 157 But the philosophy
of the law is that it would enable American businesses to act with honesty and
integrity, often improving productivity, efficiency, and product quality in order
to compete with foreign firms. 158
Since the enactment of the FCPA, many countries have enacted anti-
corruption laws geared towards international business, including Germany and
the United Kingdom. 159 The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund
do require various anti-bribery procurement practices and laws before countries
are eligible for assistance. 160 They also evaluate corruption levels before they
develop assistance strategies and implement anti-corruption projects. 16 1
FCPA enforcement, while already taking place across the world stage, may
only be enhanced by other country's own enforcement of their own anti-bribery
laws. In 2010, the United Kingdom passed the Bribery Act 2010, criminalizing
bribes to domestic and foreign officials, commercial bribery, and the receipt of
a bribe. 162 The U.K. Bribery Act surpasses the FCPA in "criminalizing the
payment, offer, or promise of a bribe, as well as the request, acceptance, or
agreement to accept a bribe."1 63 In contrast, the FCPA does not cover the
request for or the receipt of a bribe by a foreign official. 164
Meanwhile here in the United States, more and more individuals and
organizations are calling for various reforms of the FCPA. The U.S. Chamber of
Commerce issued a white paper highly critical of this new wave of FCPA
153 Westbrook, supra note 2, at 563.
154 Westbrook, supra note 2, at 511; Zyla, supra note 4, at 14.
15 5 Zyla, supra note 4, at 14.
156 d. at 17.
15 7 Westbrook, supra note 2, at 498.
15 8 Zyla, supra note 4, at 14-15.
159 Westbrook, supra note 2, at 513 14.
16 0 Zyla, supra note 4, at 19.
161 Dworsky, supra note 45, at 693.
162 Jordan, supra note 72, at 863-64.
163 Trautman & Altenbaumer-Price, supra note 76, at 158.
164 Yockey, supra note 12, at 802.
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enforcement. 165 Other former enforcement officials, international organizations,
and the media have been vocally critical of the law's recent application. 166
Many agree the law contains certain ambiguities that could be better addressed
through the legislative or administrative process. 167
VII. WHAT COMPANIES SHOULD Do
First and foremost, companies both large and small need to establish a
corporate compliance program. Not only is having a compliance program a best
practice, it also helps to provide a defense against liability for the corporation or
perhaps for its senior executives, if possible. 168 A successful compliance
program begins with a culture of compliance throughout a corporation. 169
Corporate compliance programs should include training programs, hotlines for
employee reports of bribes and other illegal activity, and monitoring
programs. 170 The compliance program should also include a code of conduct
with sanctions and penalties for those who violate the code: 171
The U.S. Sentencing Commission's Guidelines provide for a mitigated
sentence if the seven elements for an "effective compliance and ethics
program" are in place, including, establishing standards to prevent criminal
conduct, ensuring appropriate oversight by high-level personnel,
communicating the procedures and requirements to employees, and monitoring
and updating the compliance program when needed. 172
The compliance program has to extend to conducting all due diligence
before contracting with third parties as partners, or other relationships
established through mergers and acquisitions. Intermediaries, including
shipping agents, vendors, contractors, and customs agents, and their potential
violations may carry back to the corporation. 173 Failing to conduct due
diligence, failing to hire an experienced law firm, and ignoring red flags will
165ANDREW WEISSMANN & ALIXANDRA SMITH, U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL
REFORM, U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, RESTORING BALANCE: PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO
THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT (2010), available at http://www.institute
forlegalreform.com /sites/default/files/restoringbalancefcpa.pdf.
166 Koehler, Big, Bold, and Bizarre, supra note 31, at 141-44.
16 7 Westbrook, supra note 2, at 576-77 (providing a "top ten list" of FCPA questions
that the government should address).
168 Jordan, supra note 72, at 869.
16 9 Cherie 0. Taylor, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: A Primer, 17 CURRENTS:
INT'L TRADE L.J. 3, 8 (2008).
17 0 Zyla, supra note 4, at 16.
171 Dworsky, supra note 45, at 695.
172 Giudice, supra note 136, at 370.
173 David isaak, FCPA Compliance Navigating the Minefield of Intermediaries, 17
CURRENTS INT'L TRADE L.J. 22, 22 (2008).
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demonstrate that you took affirmative steps not to uncover bribery and other
illegal acts and may result in FCPA actions. 174
Adding audits by independent parties at regularly-scheduled intervals only
helps to strengthen the compliance program and allows for an independent
review of items that might be missed from an internal perspective.
Each company should draft literature for employees to read and review.
Companies should ensure that all employees sign a statement that they
understand the information provided. All employees who conduct international
business should know the limits of their conduct and procedures to follow if a
situation occurs. A retaliation-free system to report potential violations will help
to ensure compliance or quick discovery of any potential FCPA violations. 175
As a standard practice, companies must maintain accurate books and
records. They must also keep records of all transactions that the business does,
internationally and domestically. Companies are playing with fire if they have
any items "off-book." Publicly-held companies must establish standards for its
"books and records" that comply with the accounting obligations of the
FCPA. 176 Even privately-held companies should put accounting and auditing
measures in place through a compliance program to track all payments. 177
In addition, companies should assemble a "response team" including legal
counsel. The time to call a lawyer is not when an individual identifying himself
or herself with DOJ, FBI, or SEC appears at your door. But given that situation,
companies can still seek guidance from the government. Companies can request
a statement from DOJ or ask about proposed business conduct. The main goal is
to be proactive, rather than reactive.
If a corporation does frequent business with foreign officials, then it may be
a good idea to have an independent consultant serve as a supervisor for all
negotiations, such as a law firm or similar professional, or insert anti-bribery
clauses in the contracts. 178 Another best practice is to get any "unusual payment
requests" reduced to writing to shed light on all transactions. 179
VIII. CONCLUSION
The basic premise of the FCPA remains as true today as when initially
enacted thirty-five years ago: corrupt business transactions are unethical and
undermine public confidence in the free market system. However, practitioners
should be careful to note that while the law has undergone a few updates, the
most profound update has been in the enforcement of the law. In light of this
aggressive enforcement, there remains a lack of clarity in many of the FCPA's
provisions. Therefore, legal counsel should caution companies to become
174 Trautman & Altenbaumer-Price, supra note 76, at 160 61.
175 Taylor, supra note 169, at 8.
1761d. at7.
177 Id.
178 Yockey, supra note 12, at 808.
17 9Id.
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proactive in rooting out illegal payments and practices not only within their own
organization, but also with third-party providers, business partners, and
potential subsidiaries or parent organizations before a merger or acquisition.
Extensive compliance programs may be expensive, but they are the only tool to
prevent and lessen the effects of an FCPA enforcement action.
